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Analogies at War

Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965

Yuen Foong Khong

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Beschreibung

From World War I to Operation Desert Storm, American policymakers have repeatedly invoked the "lessons of history" as they contemplated taking their nation to war. Do these historical analogies actually shape policy, or are they primarily tools of political justification? Yuen Foong Khong argues that leaders use analogies not merely to justify policies but also to perform specific cognitive and information-processing tasks essential to political decision-making. Khong identifies what these tasks are and shows how they can be used to explain the U.S. decision to intervene in Vietnam. Relying on interviews with senior officials and on recently declassified documents, the author demonstrates with a precision not attained by previous studies that the three most important analogies of the Vietnam era--Korea, Munich, and Dien Bien Phu--can account for America's Vietnam choices. A special contribution is the author's use of cognitive social psychology to support his argument about how humans analogize and to explain why policymakers often use analogies poorly.

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Schlagwörter

Myanmar, Counter-insurgency, Foreign policy of the United States, William Bundy, Inference, Cuban Missile Crisis, Clark Clifford, Politics, Joseph Nye, Korea, Pentagon Papers, Analogy, Ngo Dinh Diem, International crisis, John F. Kennedy, Southeast Asia, Containment, Indochina, Political science, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, David Halberstam, Foreign policy, Policy, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Operation Rolling Thunder, Precedent, Czechoslovakia, Lyndon B. Johnson, Oral history, South Vietnam, Theory of International Politics, War, Thailand, Laos, Insurgency, Ernest May (historian), Political psychology, Princeton University Press, Adolf Hitler, North Vietnam, Decision-making, Ho Chi Minh, North Korea, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Case study, Expansionism, United States Department of State, Cambodia, Viet Minh, Vietnam Syndrome, World War II, Vietnam War, Appeasement, Prediction, National security, Hanoi, Robert McNamara, International relations, Soviet Union, Munich Agreement, George Ball (diplomat), Viet Cong, Anthony Eden, Harvard University, Mike Mansfield, Colonialism, Wars of national liberation, Adviser, Explanation