img Leseprobe Leseprobe

The Limits of Safety

Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons

Scott Douglas Sagan

PDF
ca. 57,99
Amazon iTunes Thalia.de Weltbild.de Hugendubel Bücher.de ebook.de kobo Osiander Google Books Barnes&Noble bol.com Legimi yourbook.shop Kulturkaufhaus ebooks-center.de
* Affiliatelinks/Werbelinks
Hinweis: Affiliatelinks/Werbelinks
Links auf reinlesen.de sind sogenannte Affiliate-Links. Wenn du auf so einen Affiliate-Link klickst und über diesen Link einkaufst, bekommt reinlesen.de von dem betreffenden Online-Shop oder Anbieter eine Provision. Für dich verändert sich der Preis nicht.

Princeton University Press img Link Publisher

Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik / Geschichte

Beschreibung

Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparently excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster.

Weitere Titel von diesem Autor
Scott Douglas Sagan

Kundenbewertungen

Schlagwörter

Stress testing, Cover-up, Detection, Environmental disaster, Superiority (short story), Containment building, Disarmament, Ambiguity, Normal Accidents, Nuclear safety and security, Area of responsibility, Operations plan, Cold War, Corrective and preventive action, Safety Management, Safety valve, High reliability organization, Risk, Unintended consequences, Uncertainty, Organizational safety, Hazard, John Mearsheimer, When Prophecy Fails, Security studies, Counterfactual history, Warning system, Sabotage, Arms control, Pessimism, Reprisal, Countermeasure, Alarm device, DEFCON, Reliability theory, Failure cause, Strategic Air Command, Shortage, Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, Vulnerability, National security, Residual-current device, Reconnaissance, Safety standards, Structural integrity and failure, Disaster, Weapon system, Blockade, Permissive Action Link, Technology, Roswell Gilpatric, Single Integrated Operational Plan, Fail-safe, System safety, Safety wire, Risk management, Cuban Missile Crisis, Crisis management, Aircraft, False alarm, International incident, Essence of Decision, Failure analysis, One Unit, Nuclear warfare, Emergency Action Message, National Warning System, Nuclear weapon, Deterrence theory, National Transportation Safety Board