Leseprobe
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Useful Adversaries
Thomas J. Christensen
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Sozialwissenschaften, Recht, Wirtschaft / Politikwissenschaft
Beschreibung
This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States.
Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.
Kundenbewertungen
Foreign policy, Ideology, World War II, Rapprochement, Militarism, Sino-Soviet relations, Zhou Enlai, Dean Rusk, Blockade, United States Department of State, Isolationism, Opportunity cost, International security, Anti-Americanism, Communist Party of China, Politics, Superiority (short story), Communist state, Attitude (psychology), Marshall Plan, Kuomintang, Political status of Taiwan, Romanization, Foreign policy of the United States, Adviser, Harry S. Truman, Grand strategy, China Lobby, Appeasement, Imperialism, Military budget, Second Sino-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek, National security, Mobilization, Dean Acheson, Tax, International relations, Professor, Warfare, China–United States relations, Sino-Soviet split, Korean conflict, Mao Zedong, Foreign relations of China, Peng Dehuai, Titoism, Korean War, Fiscal conservatism, Military strategy, On China, United States, Realpolitik, Demobilization, Walter Judd (politician), Containment, Manchuria, Pyongyang, Policy Planning Staff (United States), International crisis, War, Anti-communism, China, Soviet Union, North Korea, Power politics, National power, Communism, Nikita Khrushchev, Great power