img Leseprobe Leseprobe

In the Shadow of Power

States and Strategies in International Politics

Robert Powell

PDF
ca. 57,99
Amazon iTunes Thalia.de Weltbild.de Hugendubel Bücher.de ebook.de kobo Osiander Google Books Barnes&Noble bol.com Legimi yourbook.shop Kulturkaufhaus ebooks-center.de
* Affiliatelinks/Werbelinks
Hinweis: Affiliatelinks/Werbelinks
Links auf reinlesen.de sind sogenannte Affiliate-Links. Wenn du auf so einen Affiliate-Link klickst und über diesen Link einkaufst, bekommt reinlesen.de von dem betreffenden Online-Shop oder Anbieter eine Provision. Für dich verändert sich der Preis nicht.

Princeton University Press img Link Publisher

Sozialwissenschaften, Recht, Wirtschaft / Politikwissenschaft

Beschreibung

Robert Powell argues persuasively and elegantly for the usefulness of formal models in studying international conflict and for the necessity of greater dialogue between modeling and empirical analysis. Powell makes it clear that many widely made arguments about the way states act under threat do not hold when subjected to the rigors of modeling. In doing so, he provides a more secure foundation for the future of international relations theory.


Powell argues that, in the Hobbesian environment in which states exist, a state can respond to a threat in at least three ways: (1) it can reallocate resources already under its control; (2) it can try to defuse the threat through bargaining and compromise; (3) it can try to draw on the resources of other states by allying with them. Powell carefully outlines these three responses and uses a series of game theoretic models to examine each of them, showing that the models make the analysis of these responses more precise than would otherwise be possible.


The advantages of the modeling-oriented approach, Powell contends, have been evident in the number of new insights they have made possible in international relations theory. Some argue that these advances could have originated in ordinary-language models, but as Powell notes, they did not in practice do so. The book focuses on the insights and intuitions that emerge during modeling, rather than on technical analysis, making it accessible to readers with only a general background in international relations theory.

Kundenbewertungen

Schlagwörter

Disadvantage, Subsidy, Uncertainty, Bribery, James Fearon, Strategy, De facto, Trade-off, Bargaining problem, Lock-in (decision-making), Cold War, Pessimism, Agadir Crisis, Disarmament, Defensive realism, Almost surely, Power vacuum, Selection bias, Risk aversion, Suggestion, Demilitarisation, Interdependence, At Best, Idealization, Buyer's Option, Intimidation, Status quo, Belligerent, Military threat, Balance of power (international relations), Second strike, Vulnerability, Value of control, Comparative statics, Bandwagoning, Inference, Nash equilibrium, Prediction, Great power, Asymmetry, Preventive war, Debt, Security dilemma, Thomas Kuhn, Incomplete contracts, Hegemony, Pareto efficiency, Mercenary, Offensive realism, Requirement, Result, Rump state, Commitment device, Ceteris paribus, Marginal utility, Scale In, Probability, Relative gain (international relations), E. H. Carr, Sphere of influence, Information asymmetry, Marginal value, Calculation, Bargaining power, Problem play, Marginal cost, Present value, Technology, Appeasement, Total cost