Coercive Cooperation
Lisa L. Martin
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Sozialwissenschaften, Recht, Wirtschaft / Politikwissenschaft
Beschreibung
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.
Kundenbewertungen
Consideration, Dummy variable (statistics), Bandwagoning, War, Statistic, World War II, Latin America, Supply (economics), Drawback, Payment, Interdependence, Legislation, Anecdotal evidence, Probability, Cost–benefit analysis, Foreign policy, Military alliance, United States embargoes, Military occupation, Economic warfare, Measurement, National security, Quantity, Coefficient, United States Department of State, Falklands Crisis (1770), Standard deviation, Sovereignty, CoCom, International organization, Estimation, Jimmy Carter, Debt, Multilateralism, Regression analysis, Credibility, Selection bias, Case study, Defection, Technology, Statistics, Hegemony, Sender, Decision-making, Embargo, Amendment, Imperialism, Aid, West Germany, Unemployment, Member state, Result, Operationalization, Calculation, Treaty, Economic policy, Economic sanctions, Literature, Institution, Political science, United States, Economics, United Nations Security Council, Reprisal, Trade agreement, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Transaction cost, Soviet Union, International relations, Western Europe