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Mathematics and Democracy
Steven J. Brams
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Naturwissenschaften, Medizin, Informatik, Technik / Physik, Astronomie
Beschreibung
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly.
One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.
Kundenbewertungen
Supermajority, Abstention, Envy-freeness, Tax, Voting, Competition (economics), Instant-runoff voting, Mechanism design, Weighting, Representative democracy, Weighted voting, Inference, Marquis de Condorcet, Motion of no confidence, Birthday problem, Cardinal utility, Voter turnout, Direct democracy, Nash equilibrium, Pairwise comparison, Calculation, Disapproval voting, Borda count, Deliberation, Negative campaigning, Vote trading, Term limit, Proportional representation, Voting system, FairVote, Sincere voting, Paradox of voting, Scoring rule, Obscenity, Ralph Nader, Multi-party system, P-value, Counting, North American Free Trade Agreement, Arrow's impossibility theorem, Baker v. Carr, Currency, Centre-right politics, Strong Nash equilibrium, Limited voting, Open border, Markov process, Pareto efficiency, Ballot, Extrapolation, Almost surely, Consociationalism, Approval voting, Buckley v. Valeo, Probability, Trade-off, Fair division, Simpson's paradox, Full slate, Single transferable vote, Coalition government, Integer programming, Medium of exchange, Bargaining power, Single-member district, Hamming distance, Cumulative voting, Safe seat, Straw poll, Condorcet method