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Blind Oracles

Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger

Bruce Kuklick

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Princeton University Press img Link Publisher

Sachbuch / 20. Jahrhundert (bis 1945)

Beschreibung

In this trenchant analysis, historian Bruce Kuklick examines the role of intellectuals in foreign policymaking. He recounts the history of the development of ideas about strategy and foreign policy during a critical period in American history: the era of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union.


The book looks at how the country's foremost thinkers advanced their ideas during this time of United States expansionism, a period that culminated in the Vietnam War and détente with the Soviets. Beginning with George Kennan after World War II, and concluding with Henry Kissinger and the Vietnam War, Kuklick examines the role of both institutional policymakers such as those at The Rand Corporation and Harvard's Kennedy School, and individual thinkers including Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow.


Kuklick contends that the figures having the most influence on American strategy--Kissinger, for example--clearly understood the way politics and the exercise of power affects policymaking. Other brilliant thinkers, on the other hand, often played a minor role, providing, at best, a rationale for policies adopted for political reasons. At a time when the role of the neoconservatives' influence over American foreign policy is a subject of intense debate, this book offers important insight into the function of intellectuals in foreign policymaking.

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Schlagwörter

The Phantom Public, Foreign policy, Albert Wohlstetter, International relations, West Berlin, Dean Rusk, Vietnamization, Nikita Khrushchev, Strategic bombing, Missile gap, Scientism, Cold War, Robert McNamara, Inside the Third Reich, Carl Kaysen, Soviet Union–United States relations, Essence of Decision, Nuclear peace, Dr. Strangelove, Foreign policy of the United States, Aftermath of World War II, NSC-68, Soviet Union, McGeorge Bundy, Dean Acheson, Cuban Missile Crisis, North Vietnam, Counterforce, Strategist, American Thinker, United States Department of State, Positivism, World War II, Nuclear weapon, Power politics, Deterrence theory, Policy, Second strike, Bernard Brodie (military strategist), Isolationism, Limited war, Containment, Reprisal, Nuclear warfare, Flexible response, Quincy Wright, Massive retaliation, Disarmament, Anti-communism, Imperialism, National security, Balance of terror, John F. Kennedy, William Kaufmann, Eisenhower's farewell address, South Vietnam, The Structure of Science, Harry S. Truman, Security studies, Politics, Realpolitik, Anti-Americanism, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Thomas Kuhn, Russians, Henry Kissinger, Political science, Social science, Superiority (short story), Hans Morgenthau