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Agency Theory and Executive Pay

The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma

Alexander Pepper

PDF
ca. 58,84
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Springer International Publishing img Link Publisher

Sozialwissenschaften, Recht, Wirtschaft / Betriebswirtschaft

Beschreibung

This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency. 


  

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Kundenbewertungen

Schlagwörter

Executive Compensation, Reward systems, Senior Executive Pay, Executive reward, organization theory, public corporation, collective action problem