Leseprobe
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Game Theory for Political Scientists
James D. Morrow
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Sozialwissenschaften, Recht, Wirtschaft / Politikwissenschaft
Beschreibung
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science.
Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
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Nuclear warfare, Bayesian, Rational choice theory, Political science, Calculation, Economics, Uncertainty, Probability distribution, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Nash equilibrium, Nuclear strategy, Trade barrier, Decision theory, Bayesian game, Games and Economic Behavior, Pareto efficiency, Politics, Coalition government, Signaling game, Calculus of voting, Hegemonic stability theory, Common knowledge (logic), Probability, Bargaining problem, Cooperative game, General equilibrium theory, Median voter theorem, Outcome (game theory), Grim trigger, Policy, Political economy, Decision problem, Mathematical proof, Incumbent, State of the World (book series), Rationalizability, Backward induction, Voting, Principal–agent problem, Prisoner's dilemma, Bayesian probability, Extensive-form game, Folk theorem (game theory), International political economy, Strategy (game theory), Expected utility hypothesis, Bounded rationality, Utility, Paradox of voting, Probability theory, Defection, Rubinstein bargaining model, Theory of International Politics, Voting behavior, Centipede game, Trade war, Evolutionary game theory, Power transition theory, Bribery, Price war, Political party, Risk aversion, Prospect theory, Foreign policy, Coordination game, Bayes' theorem, Mathematical optimization, Preference (economics), Rationality, Mathematical economics