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Disjointed Pluralism

Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress

Eric Schickler

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Princeton University Press img Link Publisher

Sozialwissenschaften, Recht, Wirtschaft / Politikwissenschaft

Beschreibung

From the 1910 overthrow of "Czar" Joseph Cannon to the reforms enacted when Republicans took over the House in 1995, institutional change within the U.S. Congress has been both a product and a shaper of congressional politics. For several decades, scholars have explained this process in terms of a particular collective interest shared by members, be it partisanship, reelection worries, or policy motivations. Eric Schickler makes the case that it is actually interplay among multiple interests that determines institutional change. In the process, he explains how congressional institutions have proved remarkably adaptable and yet consistently frustrating for members and outside observers alike.


Analyzing leadership, committee, and procedural restructuring in four periods (1890-1910, 1919-1932, 1937-1952, and 1970-1989), Schickler argues that coalitions promoting a wide range of member interests drive change in both the House and Senate. He shows that multiple interests determine institutional innovation within a period; that different interests are important in different periods; and, more broadly, that changes in the salient collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or developmental sequence. Institutional development appears disjointed, as new arrangements are layered on preexisting structures intended to serve competing interests. An epilogue assesses the rise and fall of Newt Gingrich in light of these findings.


Schickler's model of "disjointed pluralism" integrates rational choice theory with historical institutionalist approaches. It both complicates and advances efforts at theoretical synthesis by proposing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of institutional innovation--and thus of American political development and history.

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Schlagwörter

Tax, Multiple referral, Supermajority, Activism, James Q. Wilson, Party leader, Theda Skocpol, Voting, Bill of rights, Chairman, Grand strategy, Political party, Bipartisanship, Decentralization, Hidden welfare state, Select committee, Seniority in the United States Senate, Jim Inhofe, Ideology, Seniority, Welfare reform, Legislative veto, Incumbent, National Journal, Legislator, Committee, Midterm election, Conservative Democrat, Lobbying, Jurisdiction, Legislation, Term limit, Discharge petition, Congressional Quarterly, Individualism, Social policy, Two-party system, Caucus, Cloture, Veto, Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937, Victorian America, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, Budget process, Institution, Amendment, Minimum wage, Minority leader, Dennis Hastert, Bill Clinton, Princeton University Press, Anti-statism, Newt Gingrich, Tariff, Voting methods in deliberative assemblies, 104th United States Congress, New institutionalism, Prerogative, Republican Party (United States), Path dependence, Majority, Conservative coalition, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, The Garrison State, Filibuster, Politics, Jacob Hacker, World War II, Constitutionalism, Party-line vote