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Worse Than a Monolith
Thomas J. Christensen
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Sozialwissenschaften, Recht, Wirtschaft / Politikwissenschaft
Beschreibung
In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two World Wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. Worse Than a Monolith demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy--combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries--divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of conflict, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, Thomas Christensen explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control.
Reviewing newly available archival material, Christensen examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars.
While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, he investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S.-China security relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Kundenbewertungen
Sino-Soviet relations, Carl Kaysen, Laos, Zhou Enlai, Cold War, Liu Shaoqi, Titoism, International security, Politics, Chiang Kai-shek, Containment, Beijing, China, Kim Il-sung, Shen Zhihua, Robert Jervis, United States Department of State, Ho Chi Minh, United States, Power politics, War, Mao Zedong, Korea, Korean conflict, Security dilemma, South Korea, Japan Self-Defense Forces, Pyongyang, Aaron Friedberg, China–United States relations, Princeton University Press, Communist Alliance, Stephen Peter Rosen, International relations, Communist revolution, National security, Coercive diplomacy, Collective security, Indochina, Mutual Defense Treaty (United States – Philippines), Rapprochement, Soviet Union, Randall Schweller, Foreign policy, North Korea, Foreign relations of China, Barry Posen, Diplomacy, Kuomintang, Armistice, Communist Party of China, Revolution, Korean War, Taiwan independence movement, Cross-Strait relations, Lucian Pye, Nikita Khrushchev, Taylor Fravel, East Asia, Foreign relations, Taiwan Strait, Defense pact, Samuel P. Huntington, Stephen Van Evera, Southeast Asia, Taiwan Strait Crisis, Sino-Soviet split, Al-Qaeda, Geneva Accords (1988), Security studies